

This volume is dedicated to  
Dr. ALEX BEIN  
veteran student of the history of Zionism and one  
of the founders of the Institute for Zionist Research  
of Tel-Aviv University, on the occasion  
of his seventieth birthday



# Z I O N I S M

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT  
AND OF THE JEWS IN PALESTINE

III

Editor

D a n i e l C a r p i

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## CONTENTS

### ARTICLES

- Israel Klausner**  
Joseph Zeff — "Lover of Zion" and Emissary of Herzl to America 7
- Elhanan Oren**  
Colonel Goldsmid's Scheme for the Defense of Settlement in Transjordan, 1882—1892 42
- Michael Heymann**  
Herzl and the Russian Zionists — Dissension and Agreement 56
- Dan Giladi**  
The Failure of a Settlement: Be'er Tuvia (Kastina) 100
- Mordechai Eliav**  
The Jaffa Riots of Purim 1908 152
- Yehuda Slutsky**  
A Debate on Labour Relations in Palestine in 1907 198
- Yosef Gorni**  
The Individual and Unity in the Early Philosophy of Berl Katznelson 214
- Avraham P. Alsberg**  
The Delimitation of the Eastern Border of Palestine 229
- Raphael Mahler**  
Yugnt — The Youth Movement of the Left Poalei-Zion in Poland 247
- Yonathan Shapiro**  
The Weizmann-Brandeis Conflict 258
- Gabriel Sheffer**  
The Image of the Palestinian Arabs and of the Palestinian Jewish Community as a Factor in the Mandatory Policy during the 1930's 273

lending his support to striking Jewish bakery workers. He never felt at home, and reviled all Americans, American Jews, and particularly the Zionists, for being interested only in money.

Barely a decade later he was forgotten — a drunken, toothless, neglected bachelor, despite the thousands of people he had inspired with his rousing speeches. Some time before World War I, he became active in politics, believing that political activity would lead to a solution of the Jewish problem. He worked for a time for the New York Democratic Party machine, and tried to exploit it for Zionist ends.

Immediately before the war and following it, he was intermittently active in a number of Zionist and general Jewish projects, but he no longer had his former appeal. He died in 1920, officially ignored, but accompanied to his last resting place by thousands of mourners.

#### COLONEL GOLDSMID'S SCHEME FOR THE DEFENCE OF SETTLEMENT IN TRANSJORDAN,

1882—1892

by *Elhanan Oren*

When the Peel Commission proposed its plan for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state (1937), the Zionist movement for the first time had to make practical provision for security and strategy on a national scale. But security for more than a single settlement was by no means a new concern.

Security for a large-scale settlement project had already been considered nearly 60 years earlier by Oliphant, who proposed the employment of Circassians for local defence in his "Land of Gilead" colonization scheme (1879). In 1882, Albert Michael Goldsmid, then a captain in the British army, offered to serve as commander of such a force if the scheme were implemented.

In 1887, Baron Rothschild considered the foundation on the east bank of the Jordan of a settlement of Russian-Jewish ex-servicemen whom the Baron deemed well able to defend themselves.

In 1891-92 the Hovevei Zion Movement in England drew up a plan of settlement within an autonomous region in Transjordan. Goldsmid, who headed the movement and was by that time a colonel, provided in the plan for the establishment of a local police force under the

control of the Jewish authorities of the region. Significantly, Goldsmid's plan involved the enlistment of suitable Jewish settlers to constitute this defence force.

This plan presented for the first time a practical and detailed scheme for regional defence, and provided for a "settlement police force" to be manned as well as officered by Jews. It thus merits consideration as a forerunner of later ideas for regional defence adopted by the Hagana and as a precursor of the Jewish Settlement Police founded during the disturbances of 1936—1939.

### HERZL AND THE RUSSIAN ZIONISTS — DISSENSION AND AGREEMENT

by *Michael Heymann*

When Theodor Herzl appeared on the Zionist scene his leadership was almost immediately recognized by the veteran heads of Russian Zionism. But the Russians did not believe in the feasibility of the outstanding feature of Herzl's concept: the settlement of *large numbers* of Jews within a *short time* under conditions of political autonomy in Palestine. It was felt that the Jewish people were not yet able to take advantage of a "Charter" which, according to Herzl, could alone guarantee successful settlement. By the summer of 1903, Herzl and the Russians had drifted apart. The latter were advocating cultural activities in the Diaspora and small-scale settlement in Palestine; Herzl, though he now had to admit a "Charter" for Palestine was unattainable in the foreseeable future, persisted in his pessimistic outlook for diaspora Jewry, and continued to regard the programmes of the Russian Zionists as useless. Consequently, and particularly under the impact of the Kishinev pogrom, he was open to proposals for settlement outside Palestine.

At the Sixth Zionist Congress (August 1903), to which Herzl submitted the British offer on settlement in East Africa, the differences between Herzl and the Russian leaders were laid bare. Herzl insisted on a sympathetic examination of the British offer, while the leading Russian Zionists formulated their position as follows:

- 1) Zionism was concerned with ensuring the national revival of Jews in their historic homeland; it was not bound to stand by with

“solutions” for every diaspora emergency. The Jewish people could wait till Palestine became available.

2) Speedy mass settlement in any undeveloped country was impossible, and would lead to disaster. Herzl's settlement and migration schemes were irrelevant to the urgent migration problems of Russian Jewry.

3) The proletarian masses of Russian Jews were incapable of becoming farming pioneers. Their problem could be solved by migration to industrial countries.

Herzl's opponents countered with demands for immediate settlement activity in Palestine, on however small a scale. As settlement expanded it would eventually obtain legal guarantees for large scale activities (a “Charter” as the result of settlement instead of a “Charter” as a precondition for settlement). Efforts for and in Palestine, the promotion of Jewish culture, and emphasis on the national rather than the philanthropical aspect of Zionism would in the meantime invigorate and absorb the movement.

After the Sixth Congress, the leading Russian opponents of the East Africa scheme presented Herzl with the choice of yielding to their demands or risking a split of the Zionist movement. (Kharkov Conference, November 1903). Some even sought his resignation. This crisis of confidence generated a rancorous public debate. Nonetheless, pressure for activity in Palestine and against East Africa, appeals for the continuation of Herzl's leadership, the feeling that the East Africa scheme was in any case stillborn, and Herzl's respect for the devotion of his adversaries to Palestine — all combined to prevent a breach during the meeting of the Zionist General Council in Vienna in April 1904. No full reconciliation took place, but enough common ground remained to preserve the unity of the Zionist Organization.

### THE FAILURE OF A SETTLEMENT : BE'ER TUVIA (KASTINA)

by *Dan Giladi*

The subject of this monograph is the history of one of the small early settlements in Palestine which was started in 1888 as one of Baron Rothschild's colonies and came to a tragic end with its destruction in



the violent disturbances of 1929. It is a story of failure, or rather a series of failures, since the colony's development went through a number of stages, all of them disappointing. Of special interest is the attempt that was made to rescue the settlement from decay by introducing two groups of workers, who constituted a kind of commune within the settlement.

An analysis is made of the special difficulties, both objective and subjective, which were the lot of the settlers and which made their life hard. The central settlement institutions did not mobilize all their resources to help Be'er Tuvia in its struggle for existence, and the settlers could not bear the burden alone.

The fate of the colony was typical of a number of others which did not take firm root and prosper like most agricultural settlements.

### THE JAFFA RIOTS OF PURIM 1908

by *Mordechai Eliav*

The riots which took place in Jaffa on Purim Eve 1908 were the first organized disturbances by Arabs against the reconstituted Jewish community in the twentieth century. The governor of Jaffa, Assaf Bey, exhibited hostility to the Jews immediately upon assuming office. Acting in close cooperation with the Jerusalem Pasha, he tried to sabotage the Jewish community in various ways, notably by placing obstacles in the way of land purchases for the expansion of existing settlements. In Jaffa itself, there was increased tension in Jewish relations with the Arabs, who were incited by the governor and various extremist elements.

After a series of provocations in which Arabs harassed Jewish residents, a group of young Jews decided to retaliate. On March 16, 1908, Purim Eve, a surprise counterattack wounded some Arabs and damaged some property. Later that evening as large groups of Jews, including recent arrivals to the country, gathered in the two Jewish hotels to celebrate the holiday, police and army units arrived with instructions from the governor to arrest the Jews who had been involved in the fight. The search quickly became violent — much damage was done to property and 13 Jews were injured, some of them seriously.

In Jewish Jaffa an atmosphere of terror and fear prevailed and on

the day following the arrests, community leaders organized for action against the culprits. With the help of Jewish institutions and foreign consuls, they succeeded in achieving the temporary suspension of the governor and the punishment of the commanding officers. The events were widely publicized in the Jewish world and speedy punishment of those responsible left a deep impression. The documents published here outline the course of events and the involvement of various figures especially David Wolffsohn, President of the Zionist Organization, Z. D. Levontin, Manager of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, and leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine.

Once the storm had subsided, it became obvious that events had not affected the good neighbourly relations between most Jews and Arabs; indeed the political victory of the Jews had a telling effect on the Arabs who discovered that the Jews knew how to fight back and to defend themselves. The Purim disturbances were a passing phase, but they left their mark on relations between the two communities in Jaffa.

## A DEBATE ON LABOUR RELATIONS IN PALESTINE

IN 1907

by *Yehuda Slutsky*

The strike in the winecellars of Rishon-le-Zion in March 1907 was not important in itself. Led by some new immigrants from Russia who were members of the Poalei-Zion, it involved some threats against the employers, and was over in a few days. The strike, however, aroused a stormy debate on labour relations — in Palestine as well as in the Zionist press in Europe and America, which engaged many prominent protagonists including S. Kaplansky, V. Jabotinsky, M. Smilansky, S. Gorelik, M. Zolotoreff and A. Hashin. The two extremes were represented by the Poalei-Zion versus Vladimir Jabotinsky. The former argued that the Jewish worker had an unreserved right to struggle for better working conditions. The latter maintained that there was no room for a class struggle in the developing economy of Palestine, that both workers and employers should be expected to make sacrifices — the workers to supply “cheap Jewish labour” to the investors who were risking their money in the country. Between these extreme views there were the moderates who called on workers and employers alike to find

a compromise which would further their common aim — the upbuilding of Palestine.

Jabotinsky's article translated from the original Yiddish, is appended.

### THE INDIVIDUAL AND UNITY IN THE EARLY PHILOSOPHY OF BERL KATZNELSON

by *Yosef Gorni*

In the Palestine labour movement during the Second Aliya there was, in addition to Poalei-Zion and Hapoel Hatsair, a group of politically unaffiliated who aspired to make the movement all-inclusive — much more than either a trade union or a political party. This was a peculiarly Palestinian approach very different from the usual European one which was politically oriented. Berl Katznelson was one the leaders of the non-affiliated group, and his thinking is here traced through his articles and correspondence.

Berl Katznelson believed in the importance of self-fulfilment through labour in the upbuilding of the country, and in the supreme value of the individual rather than in any body of dogma, Marxist or otherwise. Nevertheless, his group eventually joined with the highly political Poalei-Zion to form the Ahdut Ha'avoda party. This can be explained by the fact that the socialism of Poalei-Zion had become more empirical and pragmatic; the unaffiliated and the Poalei-Zion had adopted the same approach to volunteering for the Jewish Legion during World War I. In the wake of the hopes aroused by the Balfour Declaration, the messianic-romantic maximalist approach of Poalei-Zion was more acceptable to the unaffiliated than the cautious approach of Hapoel Hatsair.

### THE DELIMITATION OF THE EASTERN BORDER OF PALESTINE

by *Avraham P. Alsberg*

The eastern border of Palestine was fixed in large measure by Allenby's proclamation of October 1918 in which he divided the areas

of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (O.E.T.A.) into "South", "North" and "East". The borders between these areas were based on Ottoman administrative frontiers, and the old frontier line of the Vilayet Damascus now separated Palestine, known as "O.E.T.A. South" under a British governor, from the Damascus area, known as "O.E.T.A. East" ruled by Feisal. The Zionist leaders did not put much trust in Allenby's statement that this was a temporary arrangement arising solely from administrative and military considerations, for political motives were obvious in the document, and the similarity to the map proposed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement was evident. The Zionist Organization demanded the inclusion in Palestine of part of Transjordan up to the line of the Hejaz railroad. At the time of the Peace Conference, British politicians in general were in favour of including both sides of the Jordan in the Palestine area, and at the conference Col. Richard Meinertzhagen suggested a border which would secure the economic potentialities required for the development of the Jewish National Home ; but for political reasons, the Foreign Office refrained from putting pressure on Feisal to induce him to give up part of the territory under his jurisdiction.

When the mandate for Palestine was granted to Britain at the San Remo Conference in 1920, Transjordan was part of Feisal's kingdom and therefore not included in the proposed mandate. However, the collapse of Feisal's regime at the end of July 1920, created new conditions, and Herbert Samuel pressed for the inclusion of Transjordan in the Palestine mandate. After some doubts and hesitation Curzon agreed to the establishment of a local regime under British protection. Only in December 1920 was it decided to include the area as an independent unit within the British Mandate for Palestine. The border between the two areas was fixed in the course of negotiations on the utilization of the resources of the Dead Sea conducted by British civil servants representing the Palestine and the Transjordan administrations respectively. The details of the frontier between Transjordan and Palestine from the Gulf of Akaba to the Yarmuk were published in the Official Gazette in Jerusalem on September 1, 1922, in an order which defined the territory to be excluded from the application of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922.

A special problem arose in regard to the delimitation of the border at the Gulf of Akaba, for the King of Hejaz insisted that the district

belonged to the Hejaz and that his son Abdullah was sovereign there — not as ruler of Transjordan, but according to a special delegation of power by himself. Only after the capture of the entire Hejaz by Ibn Saud and the expulsion of King Hussein did the British Cabinet decide, in July 1925, to include the areas of Ma'an and the Gulf of Akaba officially in the Mandate for Palestine and Transjordan.

### YUGNT — THE YOUTH MOVEMENT OF THE LEFT POALEI-ZION IN POLAND

by *Raphael Mahler*

Within the Socialist-Zionist camp, the Yugnt youth movement, like its parent organization — the Left Poalei-Zion Party — occupied a special position due to its revolutionary character. In its general political orientation it gravitated towards the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement. In daily uncompromising struggles on the political, economic and cultural fronts, it was subjected to frequent police raids, the imprisonment of its active members, and repeated confiscation of its publications. Thus the Yugnt, as well as the Left Poalei-Zion in general, represented a unique synthesis of Zionism and Socialism. While the latter aspect not only constituted a declared ideology, but was put into practice in the daily class struggle, the Zionist inclination was manifested mainly in propaganda for the only radical and complete solution to the Jewish question. In the organization of aliya and in constructive work in Palestine, the contribution made by the Yugnt was minimal. This was to a large extent a result of a dogmatic interpretation of the theory of Borochof, while the passive attitude toward the Hechalutz movement reflected its negativity toward Hebrew and Hebraism, as well as disdain for the Zionist Organization as a bourgeois institution. The latter reciprocated by discriminating against Yugnt candidates for aliya in the allocation of immigration certificates. The rise of Hitlerism and the waxing tide of anti-Semitism in Poland brought about a radical change in the policy of the Left Poalei-Zion and its youth movement toward the Zionist Organization and Hechalutz, and the world conference of the party which convened in Palestine at the end of 1937, decided to participate in the next Zionist Congress.

No less than in the political and ideological fields, the Yugnt organization was unique for qualities rare in youth movement. True to its avowed character and purpose, it developed and carried out a systematic programme of educational and cultural activities. In order to supplement elementary school education, it organized a Society for Evening Courses for Workers, weekend lectures, and detailed programmes for the self-education of its members. The main source of enlightenment and knowledge for the Yugnt was its monthly magazine *Fraye Yugnt* (Free Youth) which admirably combined a thoroughness and exactness of approach with a popular and lively presentation of the most complicated problems. In addition to articles on current political events, almost every issue of the periodical contained sections on science, technology, history, literature, and occasionally philosophy. The editorial staff included Jacob Kenner, Jacob Peterseil, Joseph Rosen, Emmanuel Ringelblum (who was to gain world fame as the historian of the Warsaw Ghetto), and the writer of these lines. The Yugnt continued its underground activity even in the inferno of the Warsaw Ghetto, and its organ, the *Yugnt Ruf* (Call of Youth) appeared as an illegal mimeographed publication as late as December 1941.

### THE WEIZMANN—BRANDEIS CONFLICT

by *Yonathan Shapiro*

The article deals with the famous dispute in the World Zionist Organization (W.Z.O.) between the European Zionists headed by Chaim Weizmann and a group of American Zionist leaders headed by Justice Louis D. Brandeis. It examines the relations between the two leaders from 1919 until Brandeis' resignation in June 1921. Brandeis' ideas on the policies of the W.Z.O. in Palestine and his actions as head of the Zionist Organization of America are related to developments within the United States and the changing position of the Jewish community in those years.

The point is made that Brandeis, as a leader who emerged from the periphery to become prominent in Jewish affairs and the Zionist movement by virtue of his exalted position in American society, was more sensitive to developments in the community at large, and bound to

attach greater importance to conditions in that community and his status in it.

This weakened his position in the Zionist movement, both in the international organization and its American branch, and enabled Weizmann to defeat him in the struggle for leadership, and gain control over the movement.

THE IMAGE OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS  
AND OF THE PALESTINIAN JEWISH COMMUNITY  
AS A FACTOR IN THE MANDATORY POLICY  
DURING THE 1930'S

by *Gabriel Sheffer*

In assessing British policies toward Palestine between the two World Wars we can conclude that their ultimate aim namely, the maintenance of British rule over that territory for an unspecified period, was fully achieved. Nevertheless, the British committed some costly tactical blunders. Their chief mistake was to endorse Sir Arthur Wauchope's methods for ruling the country at first explicitly and later tacitly. His main strategy in pursuing what he believed to be British interests was embodied in the policy of governing through notables, both Arabs and Jews. Viewed in the light of the origins and development of the Jewish-Arab conflict, the failure of British policy seems even more flagrant. The British Government failed to predict and to assess correctly the impact that socio-economic developments had on the fabric of the internal political structure and activities within each of the contending communities, and on inter-ommunal relationships.

Furthermore, a deeply rooted British view, which was not altered until after the Second World War, held that those two communities could be governed together by one method or another. This prompted them to reject the Peel partition plan. By doing so they probably lost their last opportunity to resolve the Jewish-Arab conflict.

British successes and failures which at first glance seemed to have resulted from short range policy changes, were really influenced by more fundamental factors. To a large extent they were the result of cumulative changes on the international scene as well as internal British developments.

It is further argued that the ongoing changes in the psychology of the British establishment dealing with Palestine determined their short-term policy adjustments. This was more important than anything which happened or did not happen in Palestine or the Middle East.

THE OPTION ON THE EMIR'S LAND AT GHUR-EL-KABD  
— THE FIRST CONTACTS BETWEEN EMIR ABDULLAH  
AND THE ZIONIST EXECUTIVE

by *Anita Shapira*

In 1932 contacts were first made between Beduin sheikhs in Transjordan and the Jews. The sheikhs hoped to solve their economic problems by selling land to the Jews, while the main purpose of the Jews, was to open the way to Jewish settlement in Transjordan.

At the end of 1932, Emir Abdullah put out feelers regarding the lease of his own lands in Ghur-el-Kabd to Jews. These feelers culminated in a contract, signed in January 1933, in which the Emir granted the Jewish Agency an option which remained valid until 1939. The contract resulted in a whole series of Jewish-Arab-British contacts which illuminates that triangle on a broader plane.

The article discusses the Emir's motivations against the background of his desire to extend his control over western Palestine and add it to his realm. It also deals with the position of the British High Commissioner who forbade Jewish settlement in Transjordan for fear of sharp reactions on the part of the Arabs in western Palestine. Finally, it throws light on the aims, aspirations and weaknesses of Zionist policy during the period, as reflected in the affair of the Transjordan option.

MUSSOLINI, ITALIAN POLICY AND PALESTINE  
1933—1935

(A chapter in the history of the idea of Partition)

by *Gabriel Cohen*

Mussolini was apparently the first to suggest the establishment of a Jewish state in a part of Palestine, in the pre-Peel Commission period (except for Dr. Jacobson's confidential initiative within the Zionist



Organization). Mussolini presented it as the best solution to the Jewish problem as well as to the Palestine problem, but regarded it — at least after 1933 — first and foremost as being in line with Italian interests in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis British Imperialism.

The departments concerned in the Italian Foreign Ministry were strongly and consistently against the project; Zionists and Arab leaders were against it, or at best evasive and non-committal; Whitehall, from whom the Italians tried to hide their initiative, was at the time far from ready to consider any such approach. And yet Mussolini pursued the idea until the autumn of 1935, and discussed it with Dr. Weizmann, Dr. Goldmann, Rabbi Prato, and probably P. Rutenberg.

There is no evidence that Mussolini was active in the matter during the Ethiopian War and the Arab revolt. However, in some Italian quarters a new idea was current: the establishment of a Jewish autonomy in the Godjam province of Ethiopia — as a short run policy; and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as a promise for the long run.

After the publication of the Peel Commission recommendations, Italian diplomacy was set on preventing their implementation at all costs. The recommendations were seen as new proof of the basic assumption of the Italian Foreign Ministry: that a Jewish state in Palestine would serve British Imperial policy and was bound to be anti-Italian.

### UNITED STATES' PALESTINE POLICY DURING THE ARAB REVOLT OF 1936—1939

*by Mordechai Bar-On*

The first U.S. diplomatic representative in the Near East was a Minister Plenipotentiary to the Sublime Porte appointed in 1799. A legation was established in 1831. During the following century American interests in the area were religious, educational, archeological and humanitarian, rather than economic or political. A notable exception were the statements made by Woodrow Wilson during the peace negotiations after the First World War. Immediately thereafter, however, the U.S. reverted to an isolationist position.

With the beginning of modern Zionism and especially after the Bal-

four Declaration, the U.S. Congress frequently expressed its interest and support for Zionist aims, but the State Department maintained a "hands off" policy, limiting its activities to the protection of American nationals and the gathering of information.

A change took place during the 1936—1939 Arab revolt, which coincided with the rise of violent anti-Semitism in Germany and the consequent increased immigration into Palestine. Since most of the American nationals in Palestine who required protection were Jewish, U.S. interest in them could be interpreted as pro-Zionist, as could the American desire for tranquillity, which was being disturbed by the Arabs alone.

Moreover, before the Peel Commission presented its report, the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, gave in to mounting popular pressure and submitted a formal memorandum to the British, advocating the Zionist cause. He was rebuffed with the reminder that the U.S. had declined any involvement in the Palestine mandate. Though this had actually occurred in 1924, the British rebuff now dealt a blow to American prestige, and though sympathy with the Jewish National Home continued to be expressed, official State Department releases made it clear that the U.S. could not become involved.

This "hands off" policy in regard to Palestine continued for another six years, when the U.S., having renounced isolationism, became deeply involved in the Middle East.

## THE ARAB PROBLEM IN THE IDEOLOGY OF LEHI

by *Miriam Getter*

Between 1940 and 1948 — the years during which the Lehi movement was active — a change took place in the movement's attitude to Jewish—Arab relations in Palestine.

Starting with a hostile approach to the Arabs of Palestine based on the movement's insistence on the exclusive right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, and a total disregard of the existence of an Arab national movement, the Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) came to advocate Jewish—Arab cooperation in the fight against British imperialism.

Whereas in the beginning, the Arab national movement had been

derided as an artificial creation of the British, it came to be viewed as a potential ally; it was now explained that the rift between Arabs and Jews was an unwarranted result of the British "divide and rule" policy. The Lehi then switched from a solution that involved an exchange of populations to advocating a future which would find the two peoples cooperating in the politico-cultural life of the country, as part of a general cooperation in the Middle East.

As a result of the War of Independence, the Lehi abandoned its sympathetic approach, and once again came to regard the separation of the two peoples, even to the point of an exchange of populations, as the only way to avoid permanent strife.

THE PROBLEM OF ARAB SOVEREIGNTY  
IN PALESTINE, 1947—1949  
ARAB GOVERNMENTS VERSUS THE ARABS  
OF PALESTINE  
by *Meir Pa'il*

Between the establishment of the Arab League in March 1945 and the meeting of its Council in October 1947, its policy clearly indicated a desire to turn Palestine into an independent Arab state. The Arab leaders decided to help the Palestine Arabs in their struggle for independence with money, arms and volunteers. The League also reactivated the Higher Arab Committee of the Arabs of Palestine.

After October 1947, following the British government's announcement of its impending evacuation of Palestine, the policy of the Arab League showed an increasing tendency to interfere in Palestine affairs and to prevent the Arabs of Palestine from setting up a political system which might serve as a skeleton for an independent state.

In December 1947 the Arab League Council decided to establish an Arab Liberation Army, to be composed of volunteers from and supplied with arms contributed by all the Arab countries. It was stated that these forces would be subject to the authority of the Arab League and not be transferred to any Palestinian body.

In February 1948, the Council rejected a proposal of the former Jerusalem Mufti, Haj Amin el-Husseini, to establish a provisional government for Arab Palestine on the ground that it would be premature.

When the Council decided, in April 1948, on the invasion of Palestine by the five Arab armies, the strategic plans assigned no function to the Palestinians, and the Palestinian contribution to the Arab war effort was nil.

Three months later the Council decided on the establishment of a Palestinian Government, and in September Egypt permitted it to function in Gaza. This decision reflected Egypt's opposition to King Abdullah's control of the West Bank of the Jordan rather than any move to establish an independent Palestine. Indeed King Abdullah promptly rejected the Gaza Government's legitimacy.

After the Jericho conference on December 1, 1948, at which most of the West Bank notables requested Abdullah to annex the territories under his control, the King obliged the notables to declare that they did not recognize the Gaza Government. Thus political sanction was provided for the annexation of a considerable part of western Palestine to the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan.

Great Britain supplied political and military backing for the invasion of Palestine by the Arab countries, and for the plans designed to wrest the country from both Jews and Palestinian Arabs, hoping that she would thus be able to retain her bases in Palestine and Sinai at a time when her forces were evacuating Egypt and Iraq.

In the course of the invasion of Palestine conflicts of interest between the Arab countries arose and the invaders showed an increasing inclination to annex parts of the country. But the military failure of the Arabs was caused primarily by Jewish resistance rather than by the lack of coordination and conflict of interests among the Arab countries.

The Zionist leadership, and afterwards the State of Israel, tended to prefer King Abdullah to the uncompromising nationalist leaders of the Palestinian Arabs. This was due to Abdullah's Realpolitik which gradually led him to adopt a sober and moderate policy toward the State of Israel.

#### THE FIRST ISSUE OF THE EARLIEST GERMAN HOVEVEI-ZION PERIODICAL

by *Jacob Toury*

The article describes the recently discovered first issue, dated August 1, 1882, of the monthly bulletin ("Monatsbericht") published by the

B'nai-Brith Society in Kattowitz and edited by its secretary, Selig Freuthal.

This issue immediately followed a previous publishing venture of Freuthal — the educational journal “Joseph, Israelitische Jugend-Zeitung” (Kattowitz, 1878—1882).

The three issues of the “Monatsbericht” (August—November 1882) fill the gap between “Joseph” and Freuthal’s well-known Hovevei-Zion periodical “Der Colonist” (from December 1882 on) and are to be regarded as a continuation of the former and as forerunners of the latter.

The first issue of the “Monatsbericht” is analyzed in the Hebrew section and reprinted in full in the original German.

### BOROCHOV’S “THOUGHTS” ON THE JEWISH QUESTION AND KINDRED MATTERS

by *Matityahu Mintz*

The Labour Archives in Tel Aviv have two extensive manuscripts by Borochov which he called “Materials for Ethics and the Theory of Knowledge”, and which are also commonly known as “Thoughts”.

The manuscripts contain aphorisms, outlines and in some cases extended analyses. The two manuscripts were written over considerable periods and at different times. The first contains about 1950 paragraphs and was committed to writing between May 1902 and July 1904. The second, which contains 2323 paragraphs, was written between 1907 and 1910 when Borochov resided outside of Russia.

The items presented here are taken from the first group. They were selected from the collection Borochov called “the national and Jewish question”. As a whole, they strike the reader as a sort of intellectual laboratory in which Borochov delineated for the first time the observations and thoughts which were later to find their way into articles written in 1905 at the height of the Uganda furor. Some of the thoughts presented here reveal a more radical and critical approach toward the question of anti-Semitism and the probable relationship between human progress (socialism) and the Jewish problem, than do the better-known articles. Thus, their presentation enables those interested in Borochov’s thinking to get nearer to the sources of his formulations.

JEWISH—ARAB RELATIONS DURING THE EARLY DAYS  
OF TEL-AVIV

by *Aryeh Yodfat*

Some 24 documents from the Archives of the Tel Aviv—Jaffa Municipality are presented, dealing with relations between Jews and Arabs in the early years of Tel Aviv (1909—1929). This paucity of documents is due to the fact that, Tel-Aviv being the main Jewish city, its Jewish—Arab relations were frequently handled by the central Jewish institutions rather than by the Municipality. Action on the local level was primarily through unofficial contacts which were not recorded or reported; in fact, they were purposely played down and not mentioned in writing, even in internal communications. On the other hand, the Municipal Archives contain a number of documents dealing with the subject from an over-all national point of view, albeit usually against the background of some local event or situation.

The picture conveyed by these documents is naturally incomplete both because not enough documentation is available in the Archives, and also because the extant documents mainly deal with conflicts and emergencies rather than with ordinary contacts or relations. During the twenties, with the increase of anti-Jewish propaganda, the tendency to refrain from publicizing instances of contact and cooperation with Arabs was even more marked; it was feared that publicity would endanger them and expose them to attack as traitors to Arab interests and to the national cause.

The documents are given verbatim; they are generally complete and only a few have been somewhat abridged. Where the original documents are not in Hebrew, the Hebrew translations provided are those which were made at the time.

THE EDITIONS OF YEHUDA LEIB PINSKER'S  
AUTO-EMANCIPATION

by *Hela Avrahami*

This is a bibliography of *Auto-emancipation* by Y. L. Pinsker based on the collections of two Jerusalem libraries, the Jewish National and University Library, and the Library of the Central Zionist Archives.

Catalogues of the following libraries were examined as well: The Library of Congress (Washington), British Museum (London), New York Public Library, Hebrew Union College (Cincinnati), Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.), Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana (Amsterdam).

Pinsker's tract, originally published in German, has appeared in 80 editions in 21 languages: German (13 editions), Hebrew (12), English (11), Russian (9), Yiddish (6), Spanish (4), Polish (4), French (3), Italian, Bulgarian, Dutch, Hungarian, Roumanian (2 each) and Danish, Greek, Ladino, Serbo-Croatian, Portuguese, Persian, Czech and Swedish (1 each).

THE WRITINGS OF DR. ALEX BEIN — A BIBLIOGRAPHY  
by *Haim Golan*

The bibliography of Dr. Bein's writings covers a period of fifty years — 1923 to 1973. His earlier publications were published in German, but since the early nineteen-thirties most of his writings have appeared in the Hebrew press and periodicals of Palestine and Israel.

The bibliography includes books written or edited by Dr. Bein, essays, articles and edited historical documents as well as translations of his works and writings in various languages.

Dr. Bein's writings deal mainly with issues of Zionist and Jewish history as well as with certain aspects of American history and archival studies. He has specialized in the history of Jewish settlement in Palestine during the last hundred years and in the biography of Zionist leaders, especially Herzl.

## **תמצית המאמרים באנגלית**