

TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY
THE CHAIM ROSENBERG SCHOOL OF JEWISH STUDIES
THE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF ZIONISM
FOUNDED IN MEMORY OF CHAIM WEIZMANN



ZIONISM

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AND OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN PALESTINE
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The Institute for Research in the History of Zionism founded in memory of Chaim Weizmann was set up in 1962 at Tel-Aviv University through the Initiative and with the assistance of the Executive of the World Zionist Organization, with the aim of furthering the research and the teaching of the history of the Zionist idea, the Zionist movement and the Land of Israel in modern times.

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SUMMARIES

Shlomo Na'aman / MOSES HESS EXPLAINS HIS *ROME AND JERUSALEM* TO THE PUBLIC

The book *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862) was interpreted in various ways and the author decided to clarify its contents. To achieve this purpose he wrote a four-part exposition in a social-democratic journal which is published here in a Hebrew translation. It emphasizes the historical connection between the revival of the Israelite and German nations. Israel is an old nation and Germany is a new one; but according to the divine plan, Israel's redemption depends on the realization of the prophetic ideal of justice and equality, in which Germany is the pioneering force. It is the social-democratic movement that, in face of inner opposition, undertook the realization of social justice and equality and will carry it to its end. The restoration of Israel is the final stage of the divine plan.

It is thus clear that Moses Hess is not a "forerunner" of Zionism, but rather a national Jew deeply influenced by the prophetic spirit. Zionism opposes the concept of a divine time-table and aspires to restore the Jewish people "here and now." Hess' statements on the necessity to migrate to Eretz Israel and settle it, or to revive the Sanhedrin in order to update the *halachah* (the body of Jewish religious law) were all visions for the remote future rather than undertakings for the present. Until the future revival of the Sanhedrin, *Halachah* must be the norm and there is no place for religious reforms. Until then, non-believers in a personal God, like Hess himself, must support orthodox Jewry.

Hess emphasized the consistency of his writing from *The Holy History* (1837) until *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862). Only his manner of writing had been updated. His own interpretation of his works is important for minimizing scholarly differences in the legitimate interpretation of his works.

Margalit Shilo / THE INFORMATION BUREAU OF MENAHEM SHEINKIN IN JAFFA DURING THE SECOND *ALIYA* PERIOD

In 1906, the Hovevei Zion Committee in Odessa recognized the need for an information bureau in Jaffa to serve the growing influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe.

Hovevei Zion's aim was twofold: 1. To provide accurate information about Eretz Israel in order to influence only "suitable" immigrants to come; 2. To help the new immigrants who arrived in Jaffa to settle in the country, i.e. to find suitable jobs or enterprises.

Menahem Sheinkin, an ardent Zionist, headed the Information Bureau in Jaffa. He was a very passionate writer and his frequent letters are an interesting historical source. Sheinkin was frustrated mainly due to the kind of information that he was providing. Job openings and successful enterprises in Eretz Israel were very scarce, and more often than not he was telling people not to come on *aliya*. The Palestine Office, which was founded by the Zionist Organization in Jaffa in 1908, was considered by Sheinkin as rival, and rightly so. But in contrast to the Hovevei Zion's Bureau, the Palestine Office tried and partly succeeded in attracting persons to invest in the country and to start new ventures.

Reality proved that an information bureau by itself could not help the new immigrants. The first step needed in order to help immigration was to develop the country and create job opportunities. An information bureau could be useful only if it could advertise existing possibilities and opportunities.

Avigail Paz-Yishayahu / DEGANIA: ON THE WAY TOWARDS INCLUSIVE COMMUNALITY

This article focuses on the first decade of Kvutzat Degania's existence. It attempts to investigate the interrelationship between the ideological-utopian dimension and the actual establishment of the communal *kvutza*, to examine the degree of commensurability of the social ideal and its realization in practice, and to define the role of each of these two components in the creation of the first permanent communal settlement in Eretz Israel.

As the first permanent communal settlement, Degania serves as the prototype which enables us to trace the formation and development of the *kvutza* in Eretz Israel from its very beginnings and permits us to follow the communal idea in its crystallization and transformation into the guiding principle of the collective way of life.

In order to investigate the interrelationship between the utopian ideology and the attempt to realize it in practice, these two elements will be examined in juxtaposition: on the one hand, the ideological concept in positive interaction with the demands of practical existence; on the other hand, the two in conflict with each other. Similarly, the role of each of these components in the initial development of Degania will be examined.

A central aspect of life in Degania is the development of the *kvutza*'s lifestyle. The group character of the Degania *kvutza* was shaped in the

practical struggle to find viable answers to the challenges presented by daily life and needs, which ultimately mandated and led to principled decisions. At the heart of this ongoing struggle lay three central decisions which took shape during the first years. The first was the decision to continue the *kvutza's* existence as a permanent settlement group. The second concerned the nature of the *kvutza*, or more exactly, the size and desirable group-character of the *kvutza*. The third determined its communal nature. This article traces the process through which these decisions were initially adopted and the manner in which they were implemented in the daily life of Degania, and evaluates their significance and impact.

Jehuda Reinharz / CHAIM WEIZMANN'S MISSION TO GIBRALTAR IN 1917

In May 1917, Henry Morgenthau, former American ambassador in Constantinople, and a member of Rabbi Stephen Wise's synagogue, suggested a separate peace with Turkey which might leave the Ottoman realm intact. The idea received the endorsement of Robert Lansing, American Secretary of State, and Colonel House, President Wilson's closest advisor. The American Zionist leaders were too closely tied to the Wilson administration to oppose its interest in a separate peace with Turkey. But they, like Zionists everywhere, feared that such an arrangement would mean that the goal of the Zionist movement to detach Palestine from Turkey as a British-protected Jewish homeland would have to be abandoned. As soon as Weizmann got wind of the news that Morgenthau was about to be sent on a mission to negotiate a separate peace with the Turks, he interceded forcefully with the British Foreign Office to try to abort this attempt. It was agreed between Washington and London that before Morgenthau proceeded with his mission he would meet Weizmann in Gibraltar. As His Majesty's emissary, Weizmann, with the full cooperation of Felix Frankfurter who had come as part of Morgenthau's entourage, managed to derail Morgenthau's mission. This success on the eve of the negotiations which led to the Balfour Declaration, enhanced Weizmann's image as a successful negotiator on behalf of the Zionist cause.

David De Vries / HAIFA'S WORKERS DURING "THE CRISIS
OF THE THIRD ALIYA": THE EMERGENCE OF
BUREAUCRATIC IDEALISM IN THE JEWISH LABOR
MOVEMENT IN PALESTINE

The 1923 crisis of the third wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine was crucial to the evolution of the labor movement in the urban sector as a total community with centralized organization. The discussion of the tensions between workers and leaders of the Histadrut in Haifa emphasizes the importance of local developments in the molding of the character of urban labor in Palestine. Focusing on the initial period of the birth of Haifa's Jewish working class, and on its weaknesses, sheds light on the evolution of bureaucratic idealism in the labor movement.

The 1923 recession slowed down Haifa's economic growth, increased unemployment, and lowered living standards. Consequently proletarianization was enhanced, workers' organization destabilized and the Haifa Labor Council, set up in 1921 as the local cell of the Histadrut, was weakened. Workers' spontaneous responses to the crisis included geographical and occupational mobility, intensification of labor market competition, expressions of outrage, and emigration. Organized responses centered on trade-unionization and radicalization of employee-employer disputes. Suspicion and tension between the rank-and-file and their leaders were aggravated, and the political stability of the Council was threatened. Ambivalence now characterized the Council which wavered between identification with workers' needs and interests and restraining them, between encouraging workers' radicalism and its containment.

This ambivalence was reflected in the Council's attitudes towards its political language, democratic practices, trade-union strategies, industrial relations and relations with the leadership of the Histadrut and of the parties' political centers. The Council's consequent policies expressed the leadership's growing sense of the weakness of the working class and of the need to devise various means for its defense. Defending the working class, while assuring its national roles, meant the strengthening of the cohesion of the workers' community, and increasing labor power vis-a-vis Jewish employers and Arab workers. Herein lay the emergence of an idealist-bureaucratic style of labor leadership which both singularized Haifa's labor movement and set a model for the development of the Histadrut.

Eliezer Don-Yehiya / RELIGION AND POLITICAL TERROR:
ORTHODOX JEWS AND RETALIATION DURING THE
1936-1939 "ARAB REVOLT"

Most of the spiritual and political leaders and spokesmen of the Jewish Orthodox community in Palestine strongly condemned the anti-Arab retaliatory actions during the period of "The Arab Revolt" in 1936-1939 on moral and religious grounds, as well as on the basis of political considerations. At the same time they tried to deny the responsibility of Jewish organized groups, such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi underground organization, for those actions and opposed the campaign against the I.Z.L. and its Revisionist supporters. This can be explained by a combination of political considerations and a sense of "Jewish solidarity".

Opposition to violent retaliatory action was shared by both the Zionist and non-Zionist segments of the Orthodox community. However, the response of the non-Zionist *haredim* (ultra-Orthodox) mainly reflected the passive approach of traditional Jewry which forbids any use of power and resort to violence in Jewish-Gentile relations, while the attitude of the religious Zionists was influenced by universalistic values which Zionism adopted from Western culture. On the other hand, the response of those Orthodox Jews who did support the use of violence against the Arabs reflected the combined influence of the particularist tendencies of Jewish tradition and the political activism of modern Zionism.

Hava (Wagman) Eshkoli / THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE
FLIGHT OF ZIONIST LEADERS FROM EUROPE AT THE
OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II

When Poland was conquered by the Germans the Jewish elite tried to escape and save themselves either through *aliya* to Palestine or through emigration to Western countries. Among those who escaped were leaders of all the Zionist movements: M. Kleibaum (Sneh) and A. Hartglass – General Zionists; A. Reis, A. Bialopolski – Poalei-Zion; Z. Warhaftig – Mizrachi; M. Begin – Betar etc.; and also leaders of the non-Zionist Agudat Israel and Bund. Ever since, it has been claimed that the flight of the Jewish leadership was in direct contrast to the generally-accepted rule that a captain must always be the last to abandon his ship. Moreover, their flight sabotaged the resistance of Polish Jews to the Nazi conquerors. By contrast, "Hehalutz" has emphasized that its leaders did not save only themselves, returning from neutral Lithuania to the occupied area of Poland in order to reorganize their movements.

A survey of the special reasons for the escape of the Jewish leaders indicates that the danger posed to their lives at the beginning of the war was indeed greater than that faced by the Jewish community as a whole. The Nazis' special persecution of Jewish leaders was an integral part of their general treatment of the Polish and anti-Nazi leaderships. As a result, and because it was not yet clear that the anti-Jewish policy would develop in the direction of the "final solution", the Zionist leadership in Eretz Israel preferred solidarity with their counterparts in Poland over national interest. Thus, the policy was to encourage the rescue of Zionist activists from the occupied countries and to delay their departure from the neighboring free countries.

Nevertheless, this policy tended to change toward the end of the war, when some of the leaders began to recognize that it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice the few in order to save the many. This, in the light of the long-term Zionist consideration of what would be the attitudes of Holocaust survivors towards Zionism.

Shabtai Teveth / BERL KATZNELSON'S DEATH

The dissolution of Mapai's traditional triad leadership – David Ben-Gurion, Berl Katznelson, and Yitzhak Tabenkin – and the emergence of Ben-Gurion as its sole leader stand at the center of this essay.

The main contention of its first part is that, long before the party's rank and file realized it, the trio were irreconcilably divided over the partition of Palestine as the surest and only way to establish a viable Jewish state in the wake of World War II.

The Peel Commission's partition plan of 1937 served to bring out their division for the first time. At this time only Ben-Gurion embraced partition. Katznelson and Tabenkin fiercely campaigned against it. However Britain's withdrawal of the Peel scheme prevented their difference from coming to a head. Thus the opposition to Britain's White Paper of May 1939, which paved the way to a Palestinian-Arab state, found the trio in complete unity.

A gradual change of heart brought Katznelson to side with Ben-Gurion in his demand for the establishment of a Jewish state right after the war. He therefore gave his full support to the plan Ben-Gurion co-authored in May 1942 with Weizmann, better known as the Biltmore Program.

Although Biltmore demanded "that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth", Tabenkin strongly suspected it might mean an

Arab state in Palestine just as well. Ben-Gurion's public denials did not allay his fears. He therefore countered Ben-Gurion's call for the termination of the British Mandate with one for an international mandate over Palestine with the participation of the Soviet Union and China – which would favor a Jewish majority, and eventually a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine.

The first part of the essay contends that Tabenkin's outright rejection of partition was the true – although hidden – reason for the split in Mapai and eventually for the formation by Tabenkin's followers – generally known as Faction B – of an independent party, Le-Ahdut Ha-Avoda (The Movement for United Labor) in 1944.

The second part contends that despite appearances to the contrary, both leaders aimed at the split from the very outset. Ben-Gurion preferred a party united in political action and purpose, i.e. the immediate establishment of a Jewish state even at the price of partition. Tabenkin strongly believed that this was the only way to prevent partition. Delaying the split, until summer 1944, was a tactic for each to pillory the other as a divisive element and thus to gain broader followship.

It is the author's hypothesis that without Katznelson's backing and support Ben-Gurion would have been unable to achieve his purpose. Katznelson, although quite weakened in body and in spirit, was instrumental in minimizing the cost of the split to Ben-Gurion and Mapai, and in recruiting for it, and for its Jewish-state slogan, strong support. So much so, that when he died, right after the split in August 1944, Ben-Gurion, now the sole leader of Mapai, Zionism's strongest party and the strongest advocate of an immediate Jewish state, was secure enough to openly accept the price of partition.

Ben-Gurion's recognition of Katznelson's vital support is borne out by the fact that he successfully strived to make Mapai the sole guardian of Katznelson's heritage, refusing the participation of either the Histadrut or Tabenkin's party in the posthumous publication of his voluminous works.

Tamar Hermann / THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE ISRAELI PEACE COMMITTEE

The early 1950s were the formative phase of the Israeli "body politic". One important feature of the national *modus operandi* which was established then is the unchallenged superiority of the institutional, highly

controllable channels of public political participation. The alternatives, such as extra-parliamentary activity, were stigmatized by the political elite as ineffective, counterproductive and even unpatriotic. This stigma had been a major obstacle in the way of most Israeli extra-parliamentary groups ever since, but as the dismal experience of the Israeli Peace Committee (IPC) suggests, it was quite devastating in the early days of statehood. The IPC, which was constituted in 1950 as the local chapter of the World Peace Council (WPC), succeeded four times in persuading thousands of Israelis to sign its peace appeals. Notwithstanding this impressive achievement, unlike its counterparts in other countries, the IPC waned in less than five years; it failed to take root in the political arena and left no traces in it.

Beside the unfavorable attitude of the authorities, the IPC lapsed also due to: 1. Its global orientation which contradicted Israel's formal pro-Western orientation; 2. Its institutional and ideological affiliation with a non-Jewish, non-Zionist organization; 3. Its focus on matters of foreign affairs and security, which have been the most well-protected domains of the political establishment; 4. The fact that it was patronized by two opposition parties (Maki and Mapam); 5. Internal tensions between Zionist and Non-Zionist factions; 6. Acute disagreements among the Zionist members regarding the best manner in which Israel could guard its vital interests and simultaneously integrate into the region and the international arena; 7. The diffusion of scarce organizational resources in several directions at one and the same time.

תקצירים באנגלית