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Abstracts

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Walzer:

This article discusses the paradoxical history of national liberation and religious revival as manifested in three states that achieved independence after World War II: India, Algeria and Israel. Although the original leaders of all three national-liberation movements—the Indian National Congress, Labor Zionism, and the Algerian FLN—were secular, in the states that they created a politics rooted in what can loosely be called fundamentalist religion is today very powerful. The resistance of the traditional elites to national liberation, which is by definition a secularizing, modernizing and developmental creed, takes on a new ideological form after the achievement of political independence, when the defenders of traditional religion, themselves renewed and modernized, begin the construction of a counterrevolutionary politics.

Halévi:

The article begins by analyzing the historical process that brought many Europeans to question the natural framework of their common political existence: the nation and its secular contrivance, the state. The nation appears as the ultimate casualty of European nationalism, and its “crisis of identity” has further deepened in the last few years with the acceleration of European integration. The state appears less and less as the natural locus of political authority, and, in a continent where particularities are tending to diminish, a very different sense of affiliation has been emerging: the inclination to embrace “global humanism” which has no correlation with the conventional framework of representative government. Israel offers an appropriate counterproof to the tribulations of the European fading sense of nationhood. The article considers the distinctive character of Israel among modern nation-states in light of the classical definitions of the nation, in particular with regard to the role of religion and its relation to the political institutions.

Taub:

The modern nation-state is the most common, and so far the most stable, vehicle for modern democracy. The case of Zionism offers a unique opportunity for inquiring into this connection since mainstream Zionism consciously founded its institutions on the premise that democracy and the national state are mutually dependent. Moreover, ever since the early days of Zionism opposing plans to separate the two—a non-democratic national state and a non-national democratic state—have been, and still are, hotly debated. This article surveys the origins of these ideas and argues that, both politically and theoretically, neither the party of non-democratic nationalism nor the party of non-national democracy offers a viable or even coherent plan. It would seem that non-national democracy will subvert democracy as well as nationalism, and non-democratic nationalism will undermine the national as well as the democratic character of the state.

Kedar:

David Ben-Gurion is usually considered a labor leader or a Zionist national leader and is less remembered as a civilian head of state. Nevertheless, as premier of a fledgling state, he played a major role in shaping

Israel's civil institutions and establishing democracy and the rule of law. This article seeks to show that Ben-Gurion's policy as a political leader was derived from a well-defined civic worldview encapsulated in the idea of "mamlakhtiyut." Ben-Gurion understood "mamlakhtiyut" as an awareness of society's need to function as a civilized, independent polity manifesting civic responsibility and participation, respecting democracy, and upholding law and order. It is argued that Ben-Gurion's civic ideas can best be explained by the political theory known in the last 40 years as "republicanism."

Bareli:

The debate over *mamlakhtiyut* (Zionist republicanism) in the early years of the State of Israel concerned the centrality of the state in the shaping of Israeli society. This article considers whether and to what extent this debate can be seen as a struggle over the possibilities of a "left-wing mamlakhtiyut," aimed at an egalitarian politics, society and economy, as opposed to a "mamlakhtiyut," based on structural stratification in the distribution of real political, social and economic power. It concludes that although in the short and medium term Israeli *mamlakhtiyut* was egalitarian in its socioeconomic policies, its political and educational policies fostered structural inequality in Israeli society.

Don-Yehiya:

The replacement of the fragmented education system of party-controlled "streams" with a unified system of state education was a central goal of Ben-Gurion's mamlakhtiyut (statism). But in his attempt to realize this goal Ben-Gurion had to overcome the strong opposition of the loyalists of the streams, who formed a powerful coalition that was supported by a majority of Knesset members. For this purpose Ben-Gurion took advantage of the fierce competition between the streams over the education of the children who came during the period of the mass immigration in the early years of independence. He pursued a deliberate policy of exacerbating the crisis to the point that even advocates of the stream system realized that it had become a severe threat to national unity and political stability as well as to vital interests of the parties involved.

Rozin:

Previous studies have placed great emphasis on the power-political arguments that led to the failure to adopt a constitution in Israel. This article argues that the picture was more complex and that the question of collective identity was one of the main factors behind the debates on the proposal for a constitution during Israel's early years of statehood. One of the arguments raised by the opponents of a constitution was that the identity-forming aspect of the constitution was liable to ignite a cultural controversy and even a *Kulturkampf*. Although researchers have often seen this argument as a camouflage for other reasons, an examination of speeches and writings of those participating in the debate on the constitution reveals one of the basic weaknesses of early Israeli republicanism: the profound disagreement over the contours of a common Israeli identity and the way to shape it.